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WASHINGTON
LAW REVIEW
VoLUME IV FEBRUARY, 1929 NUMER 1
POSSIBLE METHODS OF RELIEVING THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
In the past several years there has been much discussion among
the bench and bar of the state of Washington concerning ways and
means for relieving the Supreme Court to some extent, at least, from
the ever-mereaslng volume of judicial business, in order that the
court may devote more time to important causes. Investigation
reveals that the volume of opinion-writing required of each judge
of the Supreme Court of this state greatly exceeds that imposed
upon most of the appellate court judges in the United States. The
individual judges of the Supreme Court of this state are each re-
quired to write, on the average, seventy-five or more opinions a year,
which, counting out the holidays and days spent on the bench, means
that but a short time is available for the study of the record in each
case and the preparation of an opinion, especially since much time
is also consumed by each judge in the study of approximately six
hundred opinions prepared in the aggregate by the other eight
judges during the same year. In view of these conditions, it is the
purpose of this discussion, solely by way of exposition and not by
way of advocacy, to present some possible methods of approaching
a solution of the problem.
I.
CREATION OF ADDITIONAL DEPARTMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT, OR
INCREAsE OF NUMBER OF JUDGEs IN THE PRESENT DEPARTMENTS
The Constitution of the state of Washington' provides in part
"The legislature may increase the number of judges from time to
time, and may provide for separate departments of said court." The
court is at present divided into two departments.
2
'Art. IV sec. 2.
Rem. Comp. Stat, sec. 8.
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It seems quite plain from the reading of the foregoing constitu-
tional provision that without any constitutional amendment the
legislature may increase the number of judges and departments of
the Supreme Court at will in order to dispatch the judicial business
of the state.
There appears to be nothing in the constitution that would prevent
the legislature from creating any number of departments and locat-
ing the departments either in Olympia or in various parts of the
state, with a court en bane sitting at Olympia to hear cases and also
to pass on departmental decisions on petition for hearing en bane.
The constitution provides8 that "the sessions of the Supreme Court
shall be held at the seat of the government until otherunse provsded
by law." All departmental decisions would have the finality at
present attaching to departmental decisions of the court, subject to
review en banc.
One advantage of tins plan over the creation of an intermediate
appellate court appears to be that there would be no necessity of
working out a division of jurisdiction between the Supreme Court
and an intermediate court, each department would have all of the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, subject to review en bane. This
plan would appear to incorporate a number of the advantages of
an intermediate court without the special creation of one. It would
make for simplicity in that there would be but one appellate juris-
diction, without raising any of the troublesome questions that have
arisen in states having intermediate courts with respect to what
cases go to which court. It would also make for expedition inas-
much as petitions for hearing en bane could be acted on with almost
the same facility as now. New briefs and some of the other formali-
ties incident to a transfer from an intermediate appellate court to
a higher court would not necessarily be reqired. This plan would
appear to offer no greater problem in keeping the law of the state
harmonious than exists in states having intermediate appellate
courts. As a matter of fact, just as is now the case, greater weight
would probably be given to departmental decisions than is usually
given to the decisions of an intermediate court.
As the departments and personnel of the court and the volume
of litigation increased, perhaps a permanent court en bane might
be instituted devoting its time only to petitions for hearing en bane
and hearings en bane, or it might be so constituted as to bring the
case up for review before nine men who had not heard the case in
' Art. IV sec. S.
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department. To give even greater finality to departmental decisions
the court en bane might adopt the policy of according conclusiveness
to departmental decisions on questions of fact (which is at present
substantially the case) and of reviewing them only where there is
an apparent confli-t between departmental decisions, or between
a departmental decision and a decision en bave, or wherethere is an
important federal or state constitutional question involved, some-
what similar to the announced policy of the Supreme Court of the
United States with respect to the granting writs of certiorari.'
At the present time, if another department of four judges were
added by the legislature, the work of each individual member of
the court would presumably be reduced very considerably The
same result could be achieved by adding two judges to each of the
existing departments, without increasing the number of depart-
ments.
An argument in favor of either of the methods mentioned in the
foregoing paragraph is that they could be carried into effect by
ordinary legislation. Moreover, as opposed to an intermediate appel-
late court there would be a direct route from the trial court to the
Supreme Court without some of the delay owing to the existence of
an intermediate appellate court.
On the other hand, either of these methods would provide for a
greater number of judges on the highest court of this state than on
any other American court, although some famous English cases have
been heard by as many, or more, judges sitting together.
II.
THE CBFATION Op COURT CommioNmRs
In a number of states relief has been provided for the appellate
court through the medium of court commissioners. Statutes provid-
ing court commissioners are now in force in Kentucky," Minnesota,6
Missouri,7 and South Dakota.8
There have also been court commissioner acts in California, Colo-
rado, Kansas, Mississippi, Nebraska and some other states. These
acts were repealed when additional judges were added to the respec-
tive supreme courts or intermediate appellate courts created.
The court commissioner plan has usually been employed in states
'Rule 38 (275 U. S. 624).
'Carrolls Kentucky Stat. (4) Sec. 962 (b) Laws Ky. 1924, Chap. 20.
Mmw. CoNsT., Art. VI, sec. 2. Mason's Minn. Stat. 1927, sec. 135-137.
Rev. Stat. Mo. 1919, sees. 2398-2405.
'Laws South Dakota, 1925, Chap. 289.
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where the constitution, unlike that in Washington, limits the num-
ber of judges of the Supreme Court to a fixed number, usually five
or seven. In the states mentioned the legislature has authorized
the judges of the Supreme Court to appoint court commisisoners who
shall have the same qualifications and standing as judges of the
Supreme Court, shall draw the same salary, and shall perform such
functions as the court may designate.
The Supreme Court commissioner plan has manifested itself in
two forms (1) a commission of usually three members who sit as a
separate body, hearing cases, formulating opinions and then sub-
mitting them to the Supreme Court for vote and approvalY (2) One
or more commissioners who sit with the judges, write opinions, dis-
cuss the cases, but do not cast a vote. Their opinions are submitted
to the regular members of the court for approval. Both plans have
been held constitutional, 0 but the latter is more prevalent at pres-
ent, and is not open to the objection that has been made to the former,
viz., that the court does not itself hear the arguments.
Supreme Court commissioner statutes have been almost uniformly
held constitutional.1' There appears to be nothing peculiar in the
constitution of the state of Washington that would take such legis-
lation without the purview of the cases upholding such laws. 2
The validity of a Supreme Court commissioner act depends on
the appointment of the commissioners by the Supreme Court, instead
of by the governor or legislature, because the court must have the
power to appoint and control its own assistants, whether masters
in chancery, receivers, or commissioners. 3
See In re Supreme Court Comm-issioners, 37 Neb. 655, 56 N. W 298
(1893) McKenzie v. Withers, 109 Tex. 255, 206 S. W 503 (1918)
10See note 11.
People v. Hayne, 83 Cal. 111, 23 Pac. 1, 17 A. S. R. 211, 7 L. R. A.
348 (1890) (leading case) In re Supreme Court Comm'rs., 100 Neb. 426,
160 N. W 737 (1916) In re Supreme Court Cominr's., Note 9, supra,
Jackson v. State (Tex.) 280 S. W 202 (1925) See also: Butler v. Cage,
138 U. S. 52, 34 L. ed. 869 (1891) Bullock v. McGerr 14 Colo. 577, 23
Pac. 980 (1890) See also cases cited in San Antonio & A. P Ry Co. v.
Blair (Tex. 1917) 196 S. W 1153 at p. 1185.
True, article IV sec. 23 provides that the judges of the superior
court may appoint court commissioners. But any argument that the grant
of the right to the superior judges, and the silence of the constitution as
to any such power in the supreme court judges, must be construed as an
implied denial of such power to the latter, does not seem to have much
force. The identical provision existed in the California Constitution of
1879 at the time People v. Hayne, note 11, supra, was decided, although
not adverted to in the decision.
"People v. Hayne, note 11, supra, In re Supreme Court Commr's., 100
Neb. 426, 160 N. W 737 supra.
SUPREME COURT RELIEF
State v. Noble,14 which is apparently the only case that has passed
adversely on the validity of a Supreme Court commissioner statute,
does so primarily because the power of appointing the commissioners
was vested in the legislature instead of the court. This distinction
is ably pointed out in People v. Hayne.15
In State v. Noble,'6 the court said.
"Neither the executive nor the legislative can select per-
sons to assist the courts in the performance of their 3udicial
duties. Grant-and this cannot be granted, save for mere
argument's sake-that it is true that the act before us con-
templated-that the commissioners shall be mere assistants
of the court, occupying, as is so earnestly and at so much
length insisted, positions analagous to those of master com-
missioners or masters in chancery, and it must follow that
such assistants shall be selected by the court, and that
neither the governor nor the legislature can choose them
for the court. From this conclusion there is no escape,
save by a denial of the independence of the judiciary and
the overthrow of the fundamental principle that the whole
judicial power of the commonwealth is in the courts. A
department without the power to select those to whom it
must intrust part of its essential duties cannot be inde-
pendent."
And In re Supreme Court Commr's.,y the court said
"The work of the commission has justified the selection
made. That portion of the act which attempts to confine
the right to appoint to nominees of the governor is clearly
void. Neither the legislature nor the governor has the right
to dictate whom the court shall appoint as its referees or
assistants. The court might as well assume to appoint the
chief clerk or sergeant-at-arms of each house of the legisla-
ture. The court, the legislature, and the executive are co-
ordinate branches of the state government, and under the
coustitution neither can exercise powers conferred by the
people upon the other."
The function of commissioners and the status of their opinions
have frequently received judicial consideration."" In general, the
2"118 Ind. 350, 21 N. E. 244 (1889).
1 See note 11, supra.
18 See note 14, supra.
21 See note 11, supra.
IgHeydrkci v. Dickey, 155 Ky. 222, 159 S. W 666 (1913) Young's
Executor v. Toliver's adrn/r. (Ky.) 284 S. W 389 (1926) Lancaster Co. 'v.
McDonald, 73 Neb. 453, 103 N. W 78 (1905) Randall v. Minneapolis Nat.
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effect of the decisions is to place commissioners and their opinions
on a parity with judges and their opinions, excepting only that
commissioners do not cast a vote.
IIII.
THE CREATION OF AN INTERMEDIATE APPETLATE COURT
The creation of an intermediate appellate court has been the
plan most widely employed to relieve the pressure on the highest
appellate court and to enable it to devote its time largely to important
cases. The wide favor of this plan is shown by its use in the fol-
lowing jurisdictions. England, 1 United States,20 Alabama,21 , Cali-
forma,22 Colorado,23 Georgia, "' Illinois,2" Indiana,2 Kansas,2 7 Louis-
Bldg., etc., Ungon, 43 Neb. 876, 62 N. W 252 (1895) Williams v. Miles,
68 Neb. 463, 96 N. W 151 (1903) Modern Woodmen v. Coleman, 68 Neb.
660, 96 N. W 154 (1903) State ex rel. Reynolds v. Jost, 265 Mo. 51, 175
S. W 591 (1915) McKenzze v. Withers, Note 9, supra, United North d
South Oil Go. v. Meredith, (Tex. Civ. App.) 258 S. W 550 (1923) Texas
Employers Ass'n. v. Jimeneg, (Tex. Civ. App.), 267 S. W 752 (1924)
City of Tyler v. Texas Employer's Ins. Ass'n (Tex. Com. of App.), 294
S. W 195 (1927) Hager v. Stokes, (Tex.) 294 S. W 835 (1927)
19 Court of Appeal of nine judges, usually sitting in divisions of three
each, (to which additional judges may be called from the trial divisions
at the request of the Lord Chancellor), inferior to the House of Lords, 36
and 37 Vict. (1873) Chap. 66, 38 and 39 Vict. (1875) Chap. 77 Court of
Criminal Appeal of nine judges, inferior to the House of Lords, 7 Edw
7, (1907) Chap. 23.
'*Nine circuit courts of appeal with three judges each, inferior to the
Supreme Court of the United States with nine judges. U. S. CONST. Art.
III, see. 1. Circuit Court of Appeals, U. S. Code, Title 28, sec. 211.
One court of appeals with three judges, inferior to a supreme court
of seven judges, CoNsT. Art. VI. sec. 1, Act of March 9, 1911, p. 95, Code of
Alabama 1923, sec. 7808.
"Three district courts of appeal, with a total of five divisions of
three judges each, inferior to a supreme court of seven judges, CONSTITu-
Tioi, Art. VI, sec. 1, Amendment adopted Nov. 8, 1904, Amendment adopt-
ed Nov. 15, 1918, Amendment adopted Nov. 4, 1924, Art. VI, sec. 4, Amend-
ment adopted Nov. 6, 1928, printed in California Session Laws of 1921 at
p. 2386.
2 Colorado Court of Appeals abolished 1905, and reestablished in 1911
for a period of four years as method of temporary relief.
' A court of appeals, with two divisions of three judges each, inferior
to a supreme court of six judges, CONsTrrunmo, Art. VI, See. 1, and Sec. 2,
paragraph 9. Georgia Code, 1926, see. 6506, 6218-1.
An appellate court with six divisions of three judges each, inferior
to a supreme court of seven judges. CONSTITUTION, Art. VI, Sec. 11, L. 1877,
p. 69 Cahill's R. S. of Ill. 1925, Chap. 37, par. 33, L. 1879, p. 222 Cahill's
R. S. of Ill. 1925, Chap. 110, par. 118.
An appellate court with two divisions of three judges each, inferior
to a supreme court of five judges. CoxsTrt U rO, Art. 7, See. 1, Acts .901,
p. 565, Burns Ann. Statutes of Ind. 1926, sec. 1343-73
"Kansas Court of Appeals abolished 1901.
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iana,2 8 Missourl, 2 9 New York, 30 Ohio,3 1 Oklahoma, 32 Tennes-
see,38 Texas. 4
Generally speaking, intermediate appellate courts may be said
to fall'into four classes. (1) those in which the jurisdiction of the
court depends, in civil matters, upon the amount involved, and,
in criminal matters, upon the amount of punishment for the offense,
all other litigation being routed direct to the highest appellate court,
(2) those in which the jurisdiction of the intermediate appellate
court depends upon the subject matter involved, all other litigation
concerning other subject matter being routed direct to the highest
appellate court, (3) those in which all, or substantially all litigation,
regardless of the amount or subject matter, is absorbed by the inter-
mediate appellate court, with some prescribed method of reviewing
its decisions by the ]hghest appellate court, and (4) those in which,
as in England, Oklahoma and Texas,. a separate court of appeal is
provided for criminal cases. Virtually all intermediate court pro-
visions allow some kind of review by the highest appellate court,
usually discretionary review.
In a number of jurisdictions where intermediate appellate courts
exist, they have been expressly created by constitutional provision,
in others by statute under constitutional provisions which have au-
2A court of appeals with three divisions of three judges each, inferior
to a supreme court of seven judges. CoNsTrU NOx 1898, sees. 84 and 98,
et seq.
gCourt of appeals with three divisions of three judges each and a
total of four courts of Appeals Commissioners, inferior to a supreme
court of seven judges and six supreme court commissoners. Coisrrru-
TioN, (1875) Art. VI, Sec. 1 and Amendment of 1884, Revised Statutes
Missiouri 1919, Section 2418.
3'Appellate division of the supreme court, with four departments of
seven judges each, inferior to a court of appeals of seven judges. CoN-
s~rrmo, Art. VI, Sec. 2, 9, Cahill's Consolidated Laws of New York 1923,
Chapter 31, Sec. 70.
"Court of Appeals with nine divisions of three judges each, inferior
to a supreme court of seven judges. CoNsTTU moN 1851, Article VI, Sec.
6 as amended September 3, 1912; Throckmorton's Ohio Gen. Code 1926,
Sec. 12223 et seq.
"Court of Criminal Appeals of three judges with exclusive and final
jurisdiction in criminal cases, and a supreme court of nine judges. Okla-
homa CoNsTromoN, Article VII, Sec. 2. Compiled Oklahoma Statutes, 1921,
Sec. 3037, et seq.
"Court of Appeals with three divisions of three judges each, inferior
to a supreme court of five judges. CoNsrruyoN, Article VI, Sec. 1, Shan-
non's Annotated Code of Tennessee (1918) Sec. 6321.
-1 Court of Civil Appeals with eleven divisions of three judges each, a
court of criminal appeals of five judges, inferior to a supreme court of
three judges assisted by a commission of appeals of six judges. CoNsrrru-
TnoN, Article V Section 1. Rev. Civil Stats. of Texas 1925, p. 506.
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thorized, or been construed to authorize the creation of such inferior
appellate courts by ordinary legislation.3 5
IV
RAIsING THE JURISDICTIONAL AMOUNT
Actually raising the jurisdictional amount as it is written into
the state constitution,3" would, it seems plain, require a constitu-
tional amendment.
V
CHANGING THE MODE OF REVIEW WITHOUT RAISING THE JURISIDIC-
TIONAL AMOUNT
But it does not follow that simply because a constitutional
amendment is required to change the jurisdictional amount as such,
considerable relief may not be obtained with respect to the amount
involved, under the present constitutional provision, by changing
the manner in which the appellate jurisdiction is exercised.
It has long since been held that the constitutional provision con-
ferring "appellate jurisdiction" is not self-executing. 7
In Western Amerscan Co. v. St. Ann Co., 38 the court said
"It belongs clearly to that class of powers, of which
there are many in the constitution, which are dormant and
inoperative until vitality and vigor are imparted to them
by action of the legislative department of the govern-
ment. "It is our opinion that, at least in the absence
of a prescribed method of appeal, designated either by the
An individual examination has been made of the constitutions and
laws of each of the American jurisdictions that now have, or have had,
intermediate appellate courts to ascertain the exact manner in which the
intermediate court was created, whether by constitutional provision, or
ordinary statute, and a separate brief on that subject has been filed with
the Judicial Council of the State of Washington with a view to furnishing
material for determining whether an intermediate appellate court can be
created in the State of Washington by ordinary legislation. Although
a not unfavorable argument for the legislative creation of an intermediate
appellate court results from that study the Judicial Council has deter-
mined that it is more expedient at this time to recommend a constitu-
tional amendment creating an intermediate appellate court. Second Report
of Judicial Council of the State of Washington, January, 1929, p. 11.
Should the occasion and necessity arise, the Washington Law Review will
at some later time print the argument in favor of the legislative creation
of an intermediate appellate court in the State of Washington.
"Art. IV sec. 4.
"Western American Co. v. St. Ann. Co., 22 Wash. 158, 60 Pac. 158
(1900)
"See note 37, supra.
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legislature or by the rules of this court, an appeal cannot
be entertained. The wisdom or unwisdom of not provid-
ing for an appeal in cases of this character is a matter
which is submitted to the discretion of the legislature.'"39
And in Cornell Unsversity v. Denny Hotel Co.,4° the court said.
"No attempt has been made to comply with this statute,
and we are not at liberty to disregard its requirements.
Cases can be brought to this court only in the manner
pointed out by the statute, and the method of procedure
there provided is to the exclusion of all others."
And in Munson v. Mudgett, 1 the court said (pp. 663-664)
"We think we are without jurisdiction to entertain the
case. The statute does not authorize superior courts to
certify questions to this court for decision. The terri-
torial statute permitted it, and Murry v. Fay, 2 Wash.
552 (26 Pac. 533), decided April 29, 1891, came to this
court so certified, but the act of March 8, 1893, prescribed
the manner in which cases may be brought to this court
for review, and sec. 38 of that act (Laws 1893, p. 135)
declared that the mode so provided 'shall be exclusive and
shall supersede all other methods heretofore provided.'
It follows that the order of the court below certifying
the questions to this court for decision is ineffectual for
the purpose of conferring jurisdiction."
It is plain from the foregoing authorities that the manner in
which the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall be
exercised may be changed at will by the legislature, at least so
long as the power to review is not interfered with.
That the words "appellate jurisdiction" are used in American
constitutions merely in opposition to the words "original jurisdic-
tion," and include more than the mere remedy by what is techn-
cally known as an "appeal" is well settled by, authority "Appel-
late jurisdiction" includes all modes of review of the decisions of
inferior tribunals, whether by appeal, writ of error, certiorari, or
other form of review.
In Marbury vs. Madison,4 2 Chief Justice Marshall said.
"It has been stated at the bar that the appellate juris-
'22 Wash. 158, 162, 164.
-15 Wash. 433, 438, 46 Pac. 647 (1896).
a 14 Wash. 662, 45 Pac. 306 (1896). And see State ex rel Young V.
Superor Court, 43 Wash. 34, 85 Pac. 989 (1906)
'1 Crauch 137, 175, 2 L. ed. 60 (1803).
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diction may be exercised in a variety of forms, and that if
it be the will of the legislature that a mandamus should
be used for that purpose, that will must be obeyed. This
is true. 2P
In In re Burnette," the court said
"Appellate jurisdiction is the power to take cognizance
of and review proceedings had in an inferior court, irre-
spective of the manner in which they are brought up,
whether by appeal or by writ of error. The constitution
confers on circuit courts appellate jurisdiction, and it is
confined to the limits there defined. Whether exercised
by a writ of error, certiorari, or appeal, as may be pro-
vided by statute, it is still appellate, and its office is to
review the proceedings of the inferior tribunal and to
decide the law of the case as presented by the record legiti-
mately brought up by the appeal."
In Ex parte Evans," it is said
"Judge Story, in his Commentaries on the Constitution
(Vol. 3, p. 626) says. 'The essential of appellate jurisdic-
tion is that it reviews and corrects the proceedings in a
case already instituted, and does not create that cause in
reference to judicial tribunals, an appellate jurisdiction,
therefore, necessarily implies that the subject-matter has
been instituted in and acted upon by some other court
whose judgment or proceedings are to be reviewed. Ths
appellate jurisdiction may be exercised in a variety of
forms, and, indeed, in any form which the legislature may
choose to prescribe. ""
In Tierney v. Dodge," it was held that a statute denying the
right of appeal, so long as it does not deny review by certiorari, is
not in conflict with the constitutional provision giving the Supreme
Court "appellate jurisdiction."4
The Supreme Court of the United States issues writs of cer
tiorari as a means of exercising "appellate jurisdiction."
And this view that a writ of certiorari is merely one method of
exercising the "appellate jurisdiction" granted by *the constitu-
tion, has been accepted by the Supreme Court of the state of Wash-
ington.
73 Kan. 609, 85 Pac. 575, 579 (1906)
" 72 S. C. 547, 52 S. E. 419, 420 (1905).
"9 Minn. 166 (Gil. 153) (1864).
"For many similar definitions of the word "appellate jurisdiction" see
Words and Phrases, "Appellate Jurisdiction"
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In State ex rel Simpson v. Smith,7 this court said.
"It is an independent proceeding and, since the
amount involved does not exceed $200, this court is with-
out jurisdiction to review the order in virtue of the lina-
tation contained in see. 4, art. 4, of the constitution. It
is no answer to say that the limitation in the constitution
is upon the appellate jurisdiction of the court, while this
is an application for a writ of review. In cases of this
sort, a writ of revmew is only another form of appeal, and
a limitation upon the one is equally a limitaton upon the
other " [Citing cases.]
That this interpretation is correct is emphasized by the constitu-
tion itself which grants the Supreme Court "power to issue writs
of review and all other writs necessary and proper to the com-
plete exercise of its appellate and revisory jurisdiction. "I s The
issuance of a writ of certiorari is simply a part of the "complete"
exercise of "appellate and revisory jurisdiction."
Since "jurisdiction" is merely the power to hear and determine
and not the duty to hear and determine, 9 any method which preserves
to the Supreme Court its power- to review without imposing the
duty to review is entirely consistent with Article IV, see. 4 of the
constitution giving the Supreme Court "appellate jurisdiction" in
all cases where the amount in controversy exceeds the sum of two
hundred dollars.
This conclusion is likewise supported by the cases upholding the
legislative creation of intermediate appellate courts on the theory
that the "appellate jurisdiction" of the Supreme Court is not
interfered with if some kind of appellate review over all the deci-
sions of an intermediate appellate court is preserved to the Su-
preme Court."
These premises having been established, viz. (1) that the con-
stitutional provision granting "appellate jurisdiction" is not self-
"102 Wash. 574, 577, 173 Pac. 428 (1918).
"ArL IV, Sec. 4.
"Bayer v. Bayer, 83 Wash. 430, 436, 145 Pac. 433 (1915) State ex rel.
Otteson v. Claftsen, 124 Wash. 389, 214 Pac. 635 (1923) State ex rel.
Goodwn v. Savzdge, 133 Wash. 532, 245 Pac. 1 (1925).
°Memphts St. Ry. Co. v. Byrne, 119 Tenn. 278, 104 S. W 460 (1907)
McElwee v. McElwee, 97 Tenn. 649, 37 S. W 560 (1896) In re Court of
Appeals, 15 Colo. 578, 26 Pac. 214 (1891) People v. Richmona, 16 Colo.
274, 26 Pac. 929 (1891) People v. Scott, 52 Colo. 59, 120 Pac. 126 (1911)
Branson v. Studebaker, 133 Ind. 147, 33 N. E. 98 (1892) Ex parte France,
176 Ind. 72, 95 N. E. 515 (1911) Curless v. Watson, 180 Ind. 86, 102 N. E.
497 (1913).
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executing and that therefore the legislature has complete control
over the methods of review, and (2) that any method of review,
mandatory or discretionary, which preserves to the Supreme Court
the "power" to decide is consistent with the constitution, the con-
clusion seems close at hand, namely, that there is nothing in the
constitution to prevent the legislature from destroying a technical
"appeal" as a matter of right in all civil cases, and substituting
therefor discretwnary review. The Congress of the United States
has done this in virtually all. cases falling within the jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court of the United States under a constitutional
provision using the words "appellate jurisdiction" just like ours.
So long as the power to review is preserved, the constitution is
satisfied. Except in criminal cases, in which the state constitu-
tion5 grants "the right to appeal in all cases," it is not necessary
that the litigant have the opportunity to appeal as a matter of
right, it is merely necessary that the court have the power to re-
view as a matter of right, if it chooses to exercise it. The consti-
tution grants to the court the absolute power to review, but not to
the litigant the absolute right of appeal, except in criminal cases.
It is, of course, well settled that a right of appeal is not essential
to due process of law at all. It is purely a matter of grace, and
exists for the litigant as a matter of right only when it is given
as a matter of right.52
If it is true that Article IV, sec. 4 of the state constitution would
be satisfied if the legislature chose to make all review in civil
cases discretionary with the court, it must follow that the legisla-
ture can give the litigant an appeal as a matter of right in some
cases, and can make review discretionary with the court in other
cases. As a matter of fact, thus it has already done in the cer-
tiorari statute" in allowing certiorari where there is no appeal or
the remedy by appeal is not adequate.
Hence, while raising the jurisdictional amount of which the
Supreme Court has "appellate jurisdiction" would require a con-
stitutional amendment, there appears to be nothing in the consti-
tution to prevent the legislature from destroying the absolute right
of appeal in civil cases at law, let us say, involving less than two
thousand dollars ($2,000.00) and providing that in. cases between
1Art. I, See. 22.
"Reetz v. Michigan. 188 U. S. 505, 47 L. ed. 563 (1903) Luckenbach
S. S. Co. v. U. S., 272 U. S. 533, 71 L. ed. 394 (1926) ,Standard Oil Co. v. Mis-
sozts. 224 U. S. 270, 56 L. ed. 760 (1912)
' Rem. Comp. Stat. sec. 1002.
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two hundred and two thousand dollars the litigant shall not have
an appeal as a matter of right, but should be required to petition
the Supreme Court for review upon a showing of merit, and let
that court decide whether it is a case in winch justice requires
that it exercise its "appellate jurisdiction." The same might be
done with certain classes of equity cases, such as chattel mort-
gage or mechanics' lien foreclosures, where the amount is small,
the law quite well settled, and the controversy from a public point
of view relatively unimportant. If the court decided that the
application for review is without merit, it could deny the applica-
tion with a mere memorandum as does the United States Supreme
Court. If the court decided to review the case it could grant the
application and decide it with full opinion as upon technical
appeals.
In this connection it is submitted that only in the event the
court concludes to take jurisdiction of the case and grant the appli-
cation would a full written opinion-be necessary under Article IV,
see. 2 of the state constitution, because it is only where the court
concludes to hear and decide the case that it is engaged "in the
determination of causes." In passing on an application for review
it is not "determining the cause "--it is merely determining
whether it shall exercise "appellate jurisdiction" for the purpose
of thereafter "determining the cause." 54
So far it has been assumed, since Article IV, sec. 4 as to "appel-
late jurisdiction" is not self-executing, that the power to regulate
the manner in wnch the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court may be invoked is within the control of the legislature. Tins
court has so held, although in the absence of legislation it has sug-
gested that it might perhaps be done by "rules of court."55 But
the legislature by the rule-making act, 5 which is valid,5 has given
to the Supreme Court "the power generally to regulate and
prescribe by rule the forms for and the kind and character of the
entire practice and procedure to be used in all appeals
and proceedings of whatever nature by the Supreme Court.
51 See Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros. & Co., 240 U. S. 251, 60
L. ed. 629 (1916) United States v. Carver 260 U. S. 482, 67 L. ed. 361(1923). These cases hold that the demal of an application for certiorar
is not an affirmance of the judgment or an expression as to the merits of
the case.
"See note 37, supra.
0Laws of 1925 Ex. Sess. Chap., 118.
"PFoster-Wyman Lumber Co. v. Superior Court, 148 Wash. 1, 267 Pac.
770 (1928).
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Accordingly it would seem that there is now nothing to prevent
the Supreme Court m the exercise of its rule-making power to
destroy appeals as a matter of right m all or certain classes of civil
cases and to substitute therefor a discretionary form of review.
AiFRED J SCHwEPPE0
*Dean of the Law School, University of Washington.
